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There is a well-developed literature on trust.1 Distrust, on the other hand, has gathered far less attention in the 
philosophical literature (though there is a burgeoning business literature on the topic2). A recent exception to that 
trend in the philosophical literature is Hawley (2014, 2015) who develops a unified account of both trust and 
distrust. My aim in this paper is to present arguments against her account of trust and distrust, though then to also 
suggest a patch. 
 
1. Hawley on trust and distrust 
 
We first require a brief overview of the different kinds of trust that one might attempt to analyse. I borrow from the 
literature to illustrate these. First, we find an attitude of trust, such that ‘x trusts y’ (cf. Faulkner, 2015: 16). We can 
illustrate this with a crude example. Given two agents, Tasha and Marvin, we may say that ‘Tasha trusts Marvin’. 
The second concept closely related to trust is such that, an agent, x, may trust another agent, y, to perform some 
action, φ: x trusts y to φ. Call this ‘contractual trust’. ‘Contractual trust’ is a three-place term, connecting two agents 
to some action. We can again illustrate the notion with an example: Tasha trusts Marvin to lock the door. Third, we 
have trustworthiness in general. ‘Trustworthiness’ is a one-placed predicate. Example: Tasha is trustworthy.3 
 
These concepts come apart; they are not the same. Some illustrative cases drawn from the literature will show this. 
Consider: a baby may trust its parents, but does not thereby explicitly have a relationship of contractual trust with 
them. After all, pre-verbal infants cannot be said to (for instance) ‘trust their parents to feed them later on’. A pre-
verbal infant lacks the abilities necessary to engage in the cognition required. Similarly, a pre-verbal infant need not 
regard her parents as trustworthy (or as untrustworthy) in general. Pre-verbal infants will not form thoughts about 
general trustworthiness at all (for this point, see Baier 1986: 244; Faulkner 2015: 5). Other examples of how these 
kinds of trust pull apart are easy. For instance, an agent x may regard another, y, as trustworthy, and yet not trust 
them to carry out some particular action.  
 
                                                     
1 See, for instance, Baier (1986), Faulkner (2015), Hardin (2002), Holton (1994), Jones (1996) and Keren (2014).  
2 Eg. Cho (2006), Kramer (1999), Lewicki et al. (1998), Schul et al. (2008) and Sitikin and Roth (1993)  
3 I borrow much of the presentation from Faulkner (2015) 
Examples from domestic life may prove useful. An agent x may regard another, y, as trustworthy, and yet x may not 
trust them to pick up x’s children from school. If x’s knowledge of y is drawn from a work context, such an attitude 
would seem very reasonable. So, where it may initially be tempting to think that we have but one concept, that of 
trust, it becomes apparent that we have at least three: trust; contractual trust and trustworthiness.4 We must also 
carefully differentiate these forms of trust from trust understood as mere reliance. Hawley claims that there a sense in 
which we might be said to trust a shelf to hold some books. This “book-shelf” sense of trust is what we can call 
trust as mere reliance; we merely rely upon the shelf to hold the books. We do not trust it (at least, not in any rich 
sense). We do not believe that the shelf has a commitment to holding the books; we would not blame the shelf if it 
failed to hold the books (if, for instance, it fell from the wall). 
 
Each of these kinds of trust has a dual—a counterpart distrust. We can find a general attitude of distrust, such that 
‘x distrusts y’. We can find contractual distrust: x distrusts y to φ. We can find distrustworthiness, though I suspect 
we might call it ‘untrustworthiness’: thus, x is untrustworthy. 
 
As with many others in the literature, Hawley’s (2014, 2015) interest is in contractual trust and, similarly germane for 
our purposes, contractual distrust. The account of trust and distrust that she delivers is that: 
 
To trust someone to do something is to believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and to rely upon 
her to meet that commitment. To distrust someone to do something is to believe that she has a 
commitment to doing it, and yet not rely upon her to meet that commitment (2014: 11).5 
 
Following Hawley, I will concentrate on contractual trust and distrust. Before turning to this task, though, it is 
incumbent on me to say something about the wider significance of the project. Why does it matter? Why should you 
care? First, if we wish to understand the way in which we interact and co-operate with those around us, 
having a clear understanding of (contractual) trust is important. Second, though I say nothing here about 
the moral implications of contractual trust, it is clear that it has moral implications; the moral dimensions 
of our lives enriches and is enriched by the many instances of contractual trust that we partake in. 
Understanding and appreciating that moral dimension of our social interactions requires clarity with 
                                                     
4 There may well be others. Nothing I say here turns on whether there are. 
5 ‘Commitment’ here is to be understood such that ‘commitments can be implicit or explicit, weighty or trivial, conferred by roles 
and external circumstances, default or acquired, welcome or unwelcome’ (Hawley, 2014: 11). In short, and as she acknowledges, 
(2014: 11) Hawley takes a very broad conception of commitment. 
respect to the nature of contractual trust and distrust. Third, there is a significant body applied research 
on the topic of trust and distrust that incorporates the fields of healthcare6, business7 and government8. 
Putting this applied research onto a strong theoretical footing requires that it be underpinned by an 
appropriate model of trust and distrust. 
 
2. The counterexamples 
Let us now turn to the counterexamples.  
 
Hillary is considering purchasing a Christmas present for Frances from an online retailer. On reading their 
website she notices the slogan: ‘we promise to deliver to our customers in time for Christmas’. Hillary 
knows the company well. Hilary has used them before at Christmas time and, indeed, they have delivered 
in a timely fashion. As it goes, Hilary also knows the individual members of the company very well and 
knows of their good intentions to fulfil this promise. Thus, Hilary recognises that the company and its 
workers have a commitment to delivering to their customers in time for Christmas. Nonetheless, just prior 
to making the intended purchase, Hilary remembers that the local store is stocking the same product for 
less. Believing in supporting local companies, Hilary decides to not make the purchase with the online 
company, instead buying from the local store. In that case, Hilary recognises that the company (and its 
workers) have a commitment to delivering to their customers in time for Christmas, but does not rely upon 
them to meet that commitment.  
 
In that case, according to Hawley, Hilary distrusts the company to deliver the Christmas present in time for 
Christmas: Hilary recognises the intention of the company to deliver Christmas presents in time for Christmas, but 
does not rely upon them to do so.  
 
But, at least so far as I can tell, that verdict is false. There need be no presumption here that Hilary distrusts the 
company to deliver in time for Christmas. Rather, for reasons wholly disassociated with her trusting of the company, 
and wholly concerned with a concern for supporting the local economy, Hillary decides to make the purchase 
elsewhere.  
                                                     
6 See, e.g., Goold (2002). 
7 See, e.g., Earl (2009: 788). 
8 See, e.g., (Aghion et al., 2010). 
 Interestingly, the case does double duty as a counterexample to Hawley’s account of trust (at least, I think that it 
does). In the case described, I think that it’s perfectly coherent to say that Hilary trusts the company to deliver in 
time for Christmas: Hilary trusts them to do so (because of her past experiences with them and because of her close 
relationship to workers at the retailer), but decides to shop elsewhere. 
 
Other cases with the same structure are easy enough to come up with, including those that don’t require of us that 
the trustee be a company or collective of any sort. Suppose that Ethel is going on holiday. Ethel wishes to ensure 
that her plants are watered while she is away. Both Alice and Alistair are good friends; reliable, competent and well-
meaning. Ethel visits Alice at 10:00. In response to Ethel’s ruminations on how to provide for her plants, Alice says: 
‘oh, I’ll look after your plants for you while you’re away’. Ethel thanks her—she accepts her offer. Ethel then goes 
to Alistair’s at 11. She is part-way through explaining to Alistair about the issue with her plants and how Alice has 
promised to help-out, when (before she can get to explaining Alice’s offer) Alistair says, ‘oh, I’ll look after your 
plans for you while you’re away”. In the end, Ethel declines the offer from Alice. As it goes, Alistair has been having 
some personal problems recently and (so Ethel judges) it would be good for Alistair to have something to do, on a 
regular basis, to distract him and ensure that he gets out of the house. In that case: Ethel recognises Alice’s promise 
to water her plants while she is away, but does not rely upon her to do so. Ethel turns down her offer. Nonetheless, 
it would be quite wrong to say that Ethel distrusts Alice to water her plants. Indeed, and as before, Ethel trusts Alice 
to water her plants, but simply prefers Alistair’s offer instead, for reasons that have nothing to do with Alice’s 
trustworthiness. 
 
For those inclined to doubt whether I am right about these cases, note:  both admit of the same kind of follow-up 
response from the potential trustee to the trustor. In both cases, the agent (company, Alice) not called upon to carry 
out the task might respond: ‘what, you asked them? Don’t you trust me/us to do what we/I said we/I would?’. And, 
in both cases, the response from the trustee is simple: ‘yes, of course I do! I just asked them (the local company, 
Alistair) to do it for other reasons’. 
 
One last thought by way of potential response: I’ve said nothing so far as to what it is to rely upon someone to 
perform some action. Given some appropriate way of spelling out reliance, perhaps my concerns can be blocked. 
However, I think that a close exploration of what Hawley has to say about reliance reveals that this does not work 
(at least, not if we adopt Hawley’s view of reliance). Here is how Hawley (2014: 4), borrowing from Holton (1994) 
would have us think about reliance: ‘to rely on someone to X is to act on the supposition that she will X’. To 
distrust someone to X, therefore requires that we not act on the supposition that she will X. In the case of Hilary’s 
Christmas present purchase, I said that Hawley’s account seems to wrongly return the result that Hilary distrusts the 
company to deliver the Christmas present in time for Christmas: Hilary recognises the intention of the company to 
deliver Christmas presents in time for Christmas, but does not rely upon them to do so. If we now ‘plug in’ this 
account of reliance, it is easy enough to see that matters stay the same: Hilary recognises the intention of the 
company to deliver Christmas presents in time for Christmas, but does not act upon the supposition that they will 
do so.9 Indeed, so far as I can tell, the case can be constructed in such a way that Hilary’s actions are neutral as to 
whether the online retailer has the intention to deliver Christmas presents in time for Christmas. 
 
3. The patch 
In both cases (and in all structurally similar cases) the objection, derived from the counterexample, to Hawley’s 
account of distrust is this: distrust is not present (though Hawley’s account predicts that it is) because the trustor is 
asking the trustee to not carry out the act in question due to reasons that are wholly independent of the trustor’s 
beliefs about the trustee and their commitments. We can fix that: 
 
To distrust someone to do something is to believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and yet not rely 
upon her to meet that commitment because of reservations about whether or not they can be relied upon to 
do it. 
 
This account of distrust successfully classifies the cases involving both Hilary and Ethel; in neither case was the lack 
of reliance because of reservations about whether or not the trustee (the company, Alice) could be relied upon to 
carry out the task. Thus, this revised analysis returns the (intuitively correct) verdict that there is no distrust. 
 
In both cases (and in all structurally similar cases) the objection to Hawley’s account of trust is this: trust (of the 
company, of Alice) to carry out the actions specified is present, despite the fact that the putative trustee is not asked 
to carry out the act in question; this is the case because the trustor recognises the commitment of the putative 
trustee to doing so, and were the trustor to ask the putative trustee to carry out the action, then the trustor would rely 
upon the trustee to do so. Again, we can fix the issue: 
                                                     
9 I think that point generalises to the other cases, but won’t work through the details here. 
 To trust someone to do something is to believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and: to either rely 
upon her to meet that commitment, or, if they are not called upon to meet that commitment, to believe 
that they could be relied upon to meet that commitment, if so called upon 
 
 
Clearly, this fix handles the cases mentioned in section 2. Hillary trusts the company to deliver in time for 
Christmas: she believes that they have commitment to doing so, and, though they are not called upon to meet that 
commitment, Hilary believes that they could be relied upon to meet that commitment, if so called upon. Ethel trusts 
Alice to water her plants while she’s away: Ethel believes that Alice has commitment to doing so, and, though they 
are not called upon to meet that commitment, Ethel believes that Alice could be relied upon to meet that 
commitment, if so called upon 
 
 
But there is more to contractual trust than handling two cases. Hawley considers many other cases. Hawley also 
considers a range of other considerations that, she claims, an account of trust should speak to. Hawley’s (2014, 
2015) papers do a lot of heavy lifting. Here, let me simply note that because of the close similarity between her view 
and mine, that I think that I can preserve all of the benefits of her model. 
 
So, to give some edited highlights: like Hawley (2014: 1-2), I can differentiate trust from reliance and also 
differentiate distrust from non-reliance (cf. Hawley (2014: 3). I can handle a case such that: 
 
 suppose your daughter’s friend promises to her (not to you) that she will stay to the end of the party and 
give your daughter a lift home. Suppose you rely upon the friend to keep this promise: you drink several 
glasses of wine, making it impossible for you to safely drive and fetch your daughter yourself. I will take it 
that you trust your daughter’s friend to keep her promise to your daughter. (2014: 11) 
 
In such a case, I think that my daughter’s friend has a commitment to staying to the end of the party and giving my 
daughter lift home; in that case, I trust her. Like Hawley (2014: 15) I can say that ‘trustworthiness requires us to 
ensure that our commitments do not outstrip our actions’ for, like Hawley, I preserve a close tie between 
commitment and trust.’ Last,  
  Suppose we are in the Wild West. In town, there is an uneasy truce, a semblance of law and order. Out in 
the desert, as everyone knows, there are no holds barred; you take your life into your hands if you venture 
there. You and I meet by chance in the desert, and you see that I am armed (of course). Before we 
exchange words, you may try to predict whether or not I will let you live. But no matter how confident you 
are in that prediction, it’s not appropriate for you either to trust or to distrust me in this respect. Out here, 
no one has promised, implicitly or explicitly, to respect life and limb. I have no commitment to let you live, 
and you should neither trust or distrust me in this respect. If I let you live, I do not demonstrate 
trustworthiness; if I shoot you, I display many vices, but not that of untrustworthiness. (Hawley, 2014: 18-
19) 
 
I return the same verdict as Hawley: that of neither being trusted nor distrusted to let my potential combatant live. 
This follows simply from the fact that there are (seemingly) no commitments to be recognised when it comes to 
shooting in this context.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Hawley (2014) demonstrates that her commitment account of trust has a good deal to recommend it. Here I offer 
some cases that suggest that it is incomplete, though then attempt to provide a patch to help complete the analysis. 
There may be other problems facing Hawley’s view, but my patched version of her commitment account of 
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